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This paper investigates the relationship between productivity and technological change. 
The question that we shall address in this paper, is whether the recent slow down in 
productivity can be explained by the slow-down of innovation activities. This paper  
attempts to measure technical change, in order to measure the effects of economic 
growth for European member states. It introduces the reader, first, to some basic 
elements and concepts that are central to understanding the approach. The 
characteristics of the innovation process are examined: its nature, sources and some of 
the factors shaping its development. Particular emphasis is laid on the role of 
technical change and dissemination based on the fundamental distinction between 
codified and tacit forms. These concepts recur throughout the paper and particularly 
in discussions on the nature and specifications of the systems approach. The paper 
concludes by summarizing some of the major findings of the discussion and pointing 
to some directions for future research activities. 
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1. Introduction  
  Many studies have suggested that there is a close correlation between 
technological development and productivity (see for example Abramovitz, 1986; 
Fagerberg, 1987, 1988, 1994), and economists have analysed different possible views of 
why productivity growth has declined. These alternative explanations can be grouped 
into the following categories:  
  the capital factor, for instance investment may have been insufficient to sustain the 
level of productivity growth;  
  the technology factor, for instance a decline in innovation might have affected 
productivity growth;  
  the increased price of raw materials and energy;  
  government regulations and demand policies that affect the productivity level;  
  the skills and experience of the labour force may have deteriorated or workers may 
not work as hard as they used to;  
  the products and services produced by the economy have become more diverse; and 
  productivity levels differ greatly across industries.  
  This paper attempts to measure the relationship between technology and 
productivity, or more precisely, to investigate the correlation between technological 
development and the decline in productivity growth. We shall empirically test the 
technological and catching-up models using data for the EU member states. 
 
2. Looking for the Growth Issues: Recent Trends on Innovation Activities and 
Productivity 
  Schmookler (1966), Kendrick (1991), and Abramovitz (1986) have studied the 
interaction between technological change and productivity. In these studies, factor prices 
were used to weight the various inputs in order to obtain a measure of total input growth. 
The approach developed by Abramovitz (1986), Solow (1957) and Denison (1962) 
involves the decomposition of output growth into its various sources, which can be 
defined as the growth accounting and residual method.  
  Growth accounting tries to explain changes in real product and total factor 
productivity based mainly on a comparison between the growth of inputs (capital and 
labour) and the growth of output. One part of actual growth cannot be explained and has 
been classified as ‘unexplained total factor productivity growth’ (or the so called 
residual). 
  In particular, following the decomposition analysis by Solow (1957), many 
alternative factors can explain the path of economic growth. According to Solow’s 
findings, technology has been responsible for 90 per cent of the increase in labour 
productivity in the United States in the twentieth century.  The unexplained decline in 
productivity growth can thus be regarded as resulting from a collapse in technological 
activities. This may have happened because the availability of technological 
opportunities has been temporarily or permanently reduced. 
  Furthermore, technological gap theories (Abramovitz, 1986; Fagerberg, 1987, 
1988, 1994) relate the technological level and innovation activities to the level of 
economic growth. According to these theories, countries where more innovation 
activities take place tend to have a higher level of value added per worker (or a higher 
per capita GDP).  Following the technological-gap argument, it would be expected that 
the more technologically advanced countries would also be the most economically 
advanced (in terms of innovation activities and per capita GDP). Technology-intensive 
industries play an increasingly important role in the international manufacturing trade of 
OECD countries. In the 1990s, OECD exports of high- and medium-high-technology   3 
industries grew at an annual rate of around 7%, and their shares in manufacturing 
exports reached 25% and 40%, respectively, in 1999.  
 
Table 1:  Recent trends in productivity growth, 1980-99 
Trend growth in GDP per hour worked  Trend growth in multi-factor 
productivity 
Total economy, percentage change at 
annual rate 




























Canada  1,1 1,3 1,3 1,4 0,5 1,2 1,1 1,3 
Mexico ..  -0,6  -1,0  -0,1  ..  ..  ..  .. 
United  States  1,3 1,6 1,3 2,0 0,9 1,1 1,0 1,2 
Australia  1,2 2,0 1,8 2,2 0,5 1,4 1,4 1,5 
Japan  3,2 2,5 2,6 2,2 2,1 1,2 1,3 0,9 
Korea  6,3 5,1 5,3 4,7  ..  ..  ..  .. 
New Zealand  ..  0,7  0,5  0,9  0,7  0,9  1,0  0,7 
Austria  .. .. ..  2,9  .. .. .. .. 
Belgium  2,4 2,3 2,3 2,4 1,7 1,4 1,3 1,6 
Czech  Republic  .. .. ..  1,7  .. .. .. .. 
Denmark  1,7 1,8 1,9 1,6 0,9 1,5 1,5 1,5 
Finland  2,8 2,9 3,0 2,8 2,3 3,3 3,0 3,6 
France  2,7 1,8 1,8 1,6 1,8 1,0 0,9 1,1 
Germany  2,3 2,0 2,2 1,8 1,5 1,1 1,1 1,1 
Greece  1,3 1,4 0,9 2,0  ..  ..  ..  .. 
Hungary ..  2,7  2,7  2,7  ..  ..  ..  .. 
Iceland ..  1,5  1,3  1,6  ..  1,3  1,2  1,4 
Ireland  3,6 4,3 4,0 4,6 3,6 4,5 4,4 4,6 
Italy  2,6 2,0 2,3 1,6 1,5 1,1 1,2 0,8 
Luxembourg ..  5,1  5,5  4,6  ..  ..  ..  .. 
Netherlands  2,9 1,8 1,9 1,7 2,3 1,7 1,9 1,5 
Norway  2,6 2,6 3,1 2,0 1,2 1,7 2,1 1,2 
Portugal ..  2,3  2,4  2,2  ..  ..  ..  .. 
Spain  3,2 1,4 2,0 0,7 2,3 0,7 0,9 0,5 
Sweden  1,2 1,7 1,8 1,6 0,7 1,3 1,3 1,3 
Switzerland ..  0,8  0,6  1,2  ..  ..  ..  .. 
United 
Kingdom 
2,3 1,9 1,9 1,9 2,2 0,9 0,8 1,0 
1.  Data for Belgium, Denmark, Greece and Ireland refer to 1983-90. 
2.  Data for Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Mexico and Switzerland start in 1991. 
3.  Data for France, Japan, Korea, Portugal and Switzerland end in 1998. 
4.  Adjusted for hours worked, based on trend series and time-varying factor shares. 
5.  Data for Belgium, Denmark, Ireland refer to 1983-90, for New Zealand to 1987-90. 
6.  Data for Germany and Iceland start in 1991. 
7.  Data for Austria, Belgium, Italy and New Zealand end in 1997. Data for Australia, 
Denmark, France, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands and United Kingdom end in 1998. 
Source:  OECD calculations, based on data from the OECD Economic Outlook No. 68. See 
Economics Department Working Paper No. 248, 2000 for details; May 2001. 
 
 Substantial  differences  in the shares of high- and medium-high-technology 
industries in manufacturing exports are found across the OECD area, ranging from over   4 
75% in Japan, Ireland, and the United States to less than 20% in Greece, New Zealand 
and Iceland.  
  Between 1990 and 1999, the annual growth rate of exports in technology-
intensive industries was highest in Mexico (29%), followed by Ireland (18%). A catch-
up effect can also be seen in Iceland and Turkey which still have a relatively low share 
of high- and medium-high-technology industries in manufacturing exports; they 
experienced annual growth of trade in technology-intensive industries of 17% and 15%, 
respectively.  
  High-technology industries represent around 50% of manufacturing exports in 
Ireland and 27% in Mexico, compared with 38% in the United States, 35% in 
Switzerland and 32% in Japan. The relatively high export share of technology-intensive 
goods in Ireland and Mexico does not appear to be the result of domestic R&D efforts; 
rather, it points to the role of foreign affiliates and technological transfers. Both countries 
import many intermediate goods for assembly, mainly from the United States, and then 
export finished goods.  Table 1 indicates the recent trends in productivity growth, for the 
period 1980-1999.  The level of technology in a country cannot be measured directly, 
but an approximation measure can be used to obtain an overall picture of the set of 
techniques invented or diffused by that country. We shall use real per capita GDP as an 
approximate productivity measure. The most representative measures for technological 
inputs and outputs are patent activities and research expenditure. Catching-up theory 
(Abramovitz, 1986; Fagerberg, 1987) starts with the investigation of growth 
performance. The main idea is that large differences in productivity among countries 
tend to be due to unexpected events (for instance wars).  
 
Table 2: R&D intensity
1 & export specialisation
2 in high-technology industries 1999 
  Export 
specialisation 
R&D intensity 
Canada 13,0  1,2 
United States  38,3  3,0 
Japan (3)  30,7  3,2 
Korea 34,2  1,3 
Denmark (3)  18,8  1,8 
Finland 24,1  2,6 
France (3)  23,1  2,2 
Germany 18,5  2,7 
Ireland (4)  46,0  1,1 
Italy 10,6  0,8 
Netherlands (4)  25,1  1,6 
Norway (4)  10,7  1,2 
Spain (3)  9,3  0,6 
Sweden (3)  27,0  3,9 
United Kingdom (3)  32,4  2,1 
1.  Manufacturing R&D expenditures/manufacturing production. 
2.  High-technology exports/manufacturing exports. 
3.  1998. 
4.  1997. 
Source:  OECD, STAN and ANBERD databases, May 2001. 
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  According to these studies, the only possible way for technologically weak 
countries to converge or catch up with the advanced countries is to copy their more 
productive technologies.  
  The outcome of the international innovation and diffusion process is uncertain; 
the process may generate a pattern where some countries follow diverging trends or one 
where countries converge towards a common trend. In this literature, economic 
development is analysed as a disequilibrium process characterised by two conflicting 
forces:  
 innovation, which tends to increase economic and technological differences between 
countries, and  
 diffusion (or imitation), which tends to reduce them. Technological gap theories are an 
application of Schumpeter' s dynamic theory. 
 
Table 3: Annual average growth rate of exports in high- and medium-high-technology 
industries, 1990-99 
  High- and 
medium-high-technology 
Total manufacturing 
Mexico 29,4  26,4 
Ireland 17,6  13,3 
Iceland 17,2  3,7 
Turkey 15,1  9,7 
Greece 10,6  2,4 
New Zealand  10,1  3,2 
Portugal 9,8  4,7 
Spain 9,5  8,2 
Australia 9,1  5,4 
Canada 9,1  8,0 
Finland 8,6  5,0 
United States  8,5  7,9 
Sweden 6,9  4,7 
OECD 6,5  5,4 
Belgium-Luxembourg 6,2  4,4 
United Kingdom  6,0  4,9 
France 5,9  4,5 
Netherlands 5,9  3,4 
Austria 5,8  4,6 
EU 5,7  4,4 
Norway 5,4  2,6 
Denmark 4,8  3,2 
Italy 4,7  4,0 
Japan 4,2  4,0 
Germany 4,0  3,1 
Switzerland 3,8  3,2 
Source:  OECD, STAN database, May 2001. 
  Table 2 illustrates R&D intensity that is Manufacturing R&D 
expenditures/manufacturing production and export specialisation that is the High-
technology exports/manufacturing exports in high-technology industries 1999. Whereas, 
Table 3 indicates the annual average growth rate of exports in high- and medium-high-  6 
technology industries for the period 1990-1999. Furthermore, Table 4 presents the 
annual average growth rate for the labor productivity growth by industry, for the period 
1995-1998.  Finally, Table 5 illustrates the Labor productivity levels relative to total 
non-agricultural business sector, for the period 1998 European Union.  
 
Table 4: Labor productivity growth by industry, 1995-98 annual average growth rate. 
































All industries  01-
95 
2,1 4,6  2,4  0,3  1,5  1,2 
 














1,2 2,6  1,4 
Mining and 
quarrying 
10-14 0,7  3,7  3,1  -3,9  -0,9  3,1  -3,5  -1,5  2,1 
Food, drink, 
tobacco 
15-16 0,2  -5,4  -5,6  -1,3  -2,1  -0,8  0,3  0,0  -0,4 
Textiles, 
clothing 
17-19 -5,3  -3,9  1,6  -4,8  -3,8  1,0  -1,7  -1,4  0,4 
Paper, printing  21-22  0,0  -0,4  -0,4  -1,7  -2,1  -0,4  0,1  1,5  1,3 
Petroleum 
refining 
23 -1,4 -0,4  1,1  -0,7  3,9  4,6  -1,9  0,9  2,8 
Chemicals 24  0,1  2,6  2,5  -0,5  0,7  1,1  -0,9  1,3  2,3 





3 1,6  3,3  1,7 
Non-metallic 
minerals 
26 1,1 3,1  1,9  -1,9  -2,1  -0,2  -0,5 -0,1 0,4 
Basic metals and 
metal products 
27-28 1,2  2,5  1,4  -1,6  -2,7  -1,1  0,4  1,0  0,6 
Machinery and 
equipment 
29-33 1,8 14,5  12,4  -0,7  4,7  5,5  0,1  3,0  2,9 
Transport 
equipment 
34-35 2,2  2,5  0,4  -0,4  -1,9  -1,5  2,0  4,3  2,3 










-0,1 1,0 1,1 
Electricity, gas 
and water supply 
40-41 -2,0  -1,6  0,4  0,8  4,3  3,5  -2,6  2,1  4,8 











1,4 2,4  1,0 
Transport and 
storage 




64 2,4  4,5  2,1  0,4  17,7  17,3  -1,1 7,6 8,7 
Finance and 
Insurance 
65-67 2,6  7,5  4,8  -1,4  0,6  2,0  0,5  3,1  2,6 
Business services  71-74  6,3  7,0  0,6 2,2  6,4  4,1  5,8 5,6  -0,2 
Source:  OECD, STAN and National Accounts databases, May 2001. 
 
  One of the main measures is the research and development intensity index 
(RDI) that is defined as: (BERD/GDP)*100, where BERD is business expenditure on 
R&D. We can also usue some other alternative measures, as GERD/GDP that is the 
ratio of gross expenditures on research and development to gross domestic product, or   7 
furthermore, GERD/GFCF that is the ratio of gross expenditures on research and 
development to gross fixed capital formation. 
 
Table 5: Labor productivity levels relative to total non-agricultural business sector, 
1998 European Union 
  EU  Labor productivity  
annual average growth,  
1995-98 
Textiles, clothing  0,7  0,4 
Wholesale/retail trade, hotels, 
restaurants 
0,7  1,0 
Wood and other manufacturing  0,8  1,1 
Construction 0,8  0,3 
Basic metals and metal products  1,0  0,6 
Food, drink, tobacco  1,0  -0,4 
Rubber, plastics  1,0  1,7 
Business services  1,1  -0,2 
Non-metallic minerals  1,1  0,4 
Transport and storage  1,1  2,2 
Machinery and equipment  1,1  2,9 
Paper, printing  1,1  1,3 
Transport equipment  1,2  2,3 
Finance and Insurance  1,6  2,6 
Post and telecommunications  1,7  8,7 
Chemicals 1,7  2,3 
Mining and quarrying  2,5  2,1 
Electricity, gas and water supply  3,1  4,8 
Petroleum refining  3,8  2,8 
Source:  OECD, STAN and National Accounts databases, May 2001.   
 
Low starting point, low rates of catch-up In the OECD area, cross-country 
differences in GDP per capita and labour productivity have eroded considerably since 
the 1950s. Over the 1950s and 1960s, income levels of OECD countries except 
Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom were catching up with those of the 
United States.  
In the 1970s, this phenomenon was less widespread and the rate of catch-up 
had fallen, Korea being the main exception. In the 1980s, there was even less catch-
up, as GDP per capita grew more slowly than in the United States in 19 OECD 
countries. Table 6 illustrates the share in total gross value added for medium and 
high-technology manufactures for the period of 1998. 
A final group of countries started with low income levels in the 1950s and 
have caught up little or not at all. It includes Eastern European countries, Mexico and 
Turkey.  Changes in levels of GDP per hour worked show a slightly different pattern. 
Out of 21 OECD countries for which data are available, only Mexico and Switzerland 
have not been catching up with US productivity levels almost continuously over the 
post-war period. Several European countries now stand even with the United States in 
terms of average labour productivity and some have even surpassed it.   8 
  Labour productivity levels relative to the total non-agriculture business sector, 
1998, European Union. The ratio of value added to employment provides an 
indication of which industries yield relatively high value added per unit of labour 
input. Although total employment is not the best measure of labour input for this 
purpose (see box), a reasonably clear pattern emerges.  
 












Iceland (1997)  #N/A  1,6  1,6 
Greece 0,6 1,2  1,8 
Norway (1997)  0,9  2,6  3,5 
New Zealand 
(1996) 
#N/A 3,7  3,7 
Portugal (1997)  1,2  3,2  4,5 
Australia #N/A  5,7  5,7 
Netherlands #N/A  6,2  6,2 
Spain 1,3  5,1  6,4 
Denmark 2,0  4,4  6,5 
Italy 1,6  5,6  7,2 
Canada (1997)  2,0  5,3  7,3 
Austria 2,1 5,2  7,3 
France 2,5 4,9  7,4 
Slovak Republic  #N/A  7,9  7,9 
United Kingdom  3,0  5,1  8,1 
Mexico 2,4 5,9  8,3 
Belgium #N/A  8,3  8,3 
EU 2,2  6,2  8,4 
United States  3,7  4,8  8,5 
OECD 3,1 5,7  8,8 
Czech Republic 
(1997) 
1,4 8,3  9,8 
Finland 4,5 5,5  10,0 
Sweden 3,5 6,5  10,0 
Hungary 3,5  6,8  10,3 
Japan 3,6  7,1  10,7 
Switzerland #N/A  11,5  11,5 
Germany 2,1  9,6  11,7 
Korea 5,6 7,0  12,6 
Ireland (1997)  7,6  8,8  16,3 
Source:  OECD, STAN and National Accounts databases, May 2001. 
 
The same was true for 20 OECD countries in the 1990s. Japan and Korea had 
the highest rates of catch-up over the 1950-99 period, with GDP per capita growing 
more rapidly, by 2.7% and 3.2%, respectively, than in the United States.    9 
Most of Western Europe had much lower rates of catch-up, typically below 
1% a year. Countries such as Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and 
Canada were already at relatively high income levels in 1950 and have since done 
little catching up with the United States. Switzerland had a marked decline in relative 
income levels. Table 7 showing the trends of growth in GDP per hour worked for the 
total economy and for the percentage change at annual rate. 
 
Table 7: Trend growth in GDP per hour worked. Total economy, percentage change 
at annual rate 
  1990-95 (1)  1995-99 (2) 
Korea 5,3  4,7 
Ireland 4,0  4,6 
Luxembourg 5,5  4,6 
Austria ..  2,9 
Finland 3,0  2,8 
Hungary 2,7  2,7 
Belgium 2,3  2,4 
Japan 2,6  2,2 
Australia 1,8  2,2 
Portugal 2,4  2,2 
Norway 3,1  2,0 
United States  1,3  2,0 
Greece 0,9  2,0 
United Kingdom  1,9  1,9 
Germany 2,2  1,8 
Netherlands 1,9  1,7 
Czech Republic  ..  1,7 
France 1,8  1,6 
Denmark 1,9  1,6 
Sweden 1,8  1,6 
Italy 2,3  1,6 
Iceland 1,3  1,6 
Canada 1,3  1,4 
Switzerland 0,6  1,2 
New Zealand  0,5  0,9 
Spain 2,0  0,7 
Mexico -1,0  -0,1 
1.  Data for Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Mexico and Switzerland refer to 1991-95. 
2.  Data for Austria refer to 1996-99; data for France, Japan, Korea, Portugal and 
Switzerland refer to 1995-98. 
Source: OECD calculations, based on data from the OECD Economic Outlook No. 68. 
See S. Scarpetta et al., Economics Department Working Paper No. 248, 2000 for 
details; May 2001. 
 
By the end of the 1990s, industries predominantly involved in the extraction, 
processing and supply of fuel and energy goods produced the highest value added per 
labour unit. These industries were more than twice as productive as the average 
industry. They account for about 5% of total OECD value added and are typically 
highly capital-intensive.    10 
Besides the energy-producing industries, those that yield the most value added 
per labour unit are those considered technology and/or knowledge intensive. In 
manufacturing, the chemical industry has the highest relative labour productivity 
level, while in services, finance, insurance and telecommunications lead the way.  
Construction, wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants and textiles 
show relatively low levels of labour productivity in all three major OECD regions. 
These industries are typically highly labour-intensive, have a high proportion of low-
skilled jobs and are not considered high-technology sectors. OECD economies are 
also characterised by considerable differences in labour productivity growth. In the 
second half of the 1990s, labour productivity growth in the three major OECD regions 
was typically highest in manufacturing of machinery and equipment, in 
telecommunications and in finance and insurance. Labour productivity growth in 
some sectors of the economy was negative over the most recent period. This may 
reflect cyclical or structural patterns, but  may  also  be  due  to  measurement      
difficulties.  
Labour productivity by industry can be measured in several ways. For the 
measurement of output, total production or value added are the typical yardsticks. If 
production (gross output) is used, productivity measures need to cover a combination 
of inputs, including intermediate inputs (such as materials and energy), labour and 
capital. If value added is used as the output measure, labour and capital suffice as 
indicators of factor inputs. The indicators shown here are determined by data 
availability and simply measure value added per person employed. Further 
adjustments to labour input, including adjustment for part-time work and hours 
worked per worker, can be made for certain OECD countries but international 
comparisons are not yet feasible.  
For the labour productivity levels, 1998 value added at current prices was 
used. For the European Union, member countries’ value added data were aggregated 
after applying 1998 US dollar GDP PPPs – industry-specific PPPs are preferable, but 
are not available for all sectors and countries.  
For value-added volumes (used to estimate labour productivity growth), the 
European Union series were derived by aggregating member countries’ value-added 
volumes after applying 1995 US dollar GDP PPPs, the reference year for the volume 
series being 1995. This is not an ideal practice since some countries, such as France 
and Sweden, now use annually reweighted chained (rather than fixed-weight) 
Laspeyres aggregation methods to derive their value-added volumes by industry. 
Volumes calculated in this manner are generally non-additive.  
The labour productivity levels by industry are relative to the total non-
agriculture business sector. This consists of all industries except agriculture, hunting, 
forestry and fishing (ISIC 01-05), real estate activities (ISIC 70) and community, 
social and personal services (ISIC 75-99; includes mainly non-market activities such 
as public administration, education and health).  
Productivity growth in some services sectors may be low because estimates of 
real output are based on input measures (such as employment). Much effort is 
currently being undertaken in Member countries to improve the measurement of real 
output in the services sectors. Sectors that are considered technology- and/or 
knowledge-intensive are highlighted in the graphs.   
 
3. The Relationship Between Productivity, Technical Change and Growth 
According to the OECD Productivity Manual: There are many different 
approaches to the measurement of productivity. The calculation and interpretation of   11 
the different measures are not straightforward, particularly for international 
comparisons. The OECD Productivity Manual is the first comprehensive guide to 
various productivity measures and focuses on the industry level.   
OECD estimates of productivity adjusted for the business cycle: For its recent 
work on economic growth, the OECD developed estimates of productivity growth 
adjusted for the business cycle. Most productivity measures are procyclical; they tend 
to accelerate during periods of economic expansion and decelerate during periods of 
recession. This is partly due to measurement: variations in volume output tend to be 
relatively accurately reflected in economic statistics, but variations in the rate of 
utilisation of inputs are at best only partially picked up. Even if capacity utilisation is 
accurately measured, the standard model of productivity fits the realities of the 
business cycle somewhat awkwardly. Much economic and index number theory relies 
on long-term, equilibrium relationships involving few unforeseen events for economic 
actors. Table 8 illustrates the income and the productivity levels for the period of 
1999. The percentage point of differences for PPP, (Purchase Power Parity) it’s based 
on Gross Domestic Product per capita respecting the United States. 
            The economic model of productivity measurement is therefore easier to 
implement and interpret during periods of continued and moderate expansion than 
during a rapidly changing business cycle. It is therefore appropriate to examine 
productivity growth over longer periods of time or to adjust productivity estimates for 
cyclical fluctuations.  Usually, TFP is the total factor productivity that is a weighted 
average of the growth in labour and capital productivity. Whereas, the capital 
productivity is the ratio of output to capital and the labour productivity is the output per 
employed person. 
  As expected, the best results are obtained for the logarithmic models, which 
imply a steeper curve. Patenting data reflect the innovation process, while both the 
research indexes reflect the imitation and the innovation process. The research and 
development data reflect imitation, innovation and diffusion activities. The relation 
between productivity (as measured by per capita GDP) and innovation activities should 
be expected to be log linear, rather than linear and steeper for the patent data than for the 
index based on research data. 
  For structural change we use as an approximation changes in the share of exports 
and agriculture in GDP. Technological gap models, as developed here, can say little 
about how to boost the level of innovation activities or improve diffusion and 
innovation. We test the following versions of the models:  
 
 
GDP (or PROD) = f [GDPPC, EXPA (or GERD), INV] (the basic model)    (1) 
 
GDP (or PROD) = f [GDPPC, EXPA (or GERD), INV, EXP]   (2) 
 
GDP = f [GDPPC, EXPA  ( o r   G E R D ) ,   I N V ,   T R D ]       ( 3 )  
 
 
  Since annual observations are strongly affected by short-term fluctuations, 
average values of the variables for the period 1973~1997 are calculated. The first model 
may be regarded as a pure supply model, where economic growth is a function of the 
level of economic development GDPPC (GDP per capita with a negative expected sign), 
the growth of patenting activity (EXPA with a positive sign) and investment share (INV 
with a positive sign). However it can be argued that this model overlooks differences in   12 
overall growth rates between periods due to other factors, and especially differences in 
economic policies.  
 
Table 8: Income and productivity levels, 1999. Percentage point differences in PPP-
based GDP per capita with respect to the United States 
  Gap  Productivity  Labour use (1) 
Switzerland -15 -9  -6 
Norway -17  8  -25 
Canada -21  -14  -6 
Denmark -21  -7  -14 
Iceland -22  -28  6 
Netherlands -22  9  -32 
Australia -24  -16  -8 
Japan -25  -26  1 
Ireland -25  -4  -21 
Belgium -27  10  -36 
Austria -27  -5  -22 
Germany -30  -6  -23 
Italy -32  6  -38 
Sweden -32  -16  -15 
United Kingdom  -32  -13  -19 
Finland -33  -18  -15 
France -35  -3  -32 
New Zealand  -45  -38  -7 
Spain -46  -24  -23 
Portugal -51  -47  -5 
Korea -53  -60  7 
Greece -55  -44  -12 
Czech Republic  -60  -61  1 
Hungary -67  -55  -12 
Mexico -75  -69  -6 
1. This reflects the joint effect of differences in the demographic structure of 
countries (the ratio of the working-age population to the total population), in 
employment rates and in average hours worked per person 
Source:  OECD, GDP and population from National Accounts database; 
working-age population, labor force and employment from Labor Force 
database; hours worked from OECD calculations, see  S. Scarpetta, et al., 





  We can easily investigate the relationship between these two approximate 
measures using cross-section data on average growth rates in the period 1973~97 for the 
EU member states. The results are presented in Table 9. Whatever the form of the 
independent variable, a positive relationship between productivity and gross expenditure 
on R&D; this can be interpreted as due to the poor reliability of gross research 
expenditure data as an explanatory variable of innovation activities.  
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Table 4: Relationship between productivity and innovation for the EU member states, 
1973~1997 
Relation between productivity and patents: 
  GDPPC = 5547.23 + 529.695EXPA 
                 t =     (7.455)          (4.544)                 R
2 = 0.28 (adj.df 0.22). DW = 2.05  
Rho (autocorrelation coefficient) = -0.0962, t = -0.344. SEs and variance shown are 
heteroskedastic consistent estimates. 
The logarithm models: 
  LGDPPC = 8.068 + 0.564LEXPA 
                  t  =   (21.099)      (2.336)             R
2 = 0.23 (adj.df 0.16). DW = 1.69  
Rho (autocorrelation coefficient) = 0.705, t = 0.223. SE’s and variance shown are 
heteroskedastic consistent estimates.  
  LLGDPPC = 2.160 + 0.783LLEXPA 
                  t  = (128.747)      (2.868)         R
2 = 0.31 (adj. df 0.24). DW = 1.81  
Rho (autocorrelation coefficient) = -0.032, t = -0.101. SEs and variance shown are 
heteroskedastic consistent estimates.  
The relation between productivity and gross expenditures on research and 
development: 
 GDPPC = 9584.54 - 366.10GERD 
             t   =     (5.738)        (-1.324)           R
2 = 0.76 (adj. df 0.52). DW = 1.644  
Rho (autocorrelation coefficient) = 0.131, t = 0.475. SEs and variance shown are 
heteroskedastic consistent estimates. 
The logarithm models: 
 LGDPPC = 9.424 - 0.384LGERD 
                   t  =      (25.721)   (-1.529)                    R
2 = 0.091 (adj.df 0.02) DW = 1.24  
Rho (autocorrelation coefficient) = 0.347,  t = 1.352. SEs and variance shown are 
heteroskedastic consistent estimates.  
LLGDPPC = 2.200 - 0.0647LLGERD 
                    t   =  (141.439)    (-1.586)                R
2 = 0.087 (adj.df 0.017) DW = 1.177  
Rho (autocorrelation coefficient) = 0.385, t = 1.525. SEs and variance shown are 
heteroskedastic consistent estimates.  
Notes: GDPPC = GDP per capita average for the period 1973~1997, absolute values in 
constant (1985) prices (US$ 000) for per capita GDP. EXPA = average annual growth 
rates for the period 1973~1997 for external patent applications. GERD = average 
annual growth rates for the period for gross expenditure on research and development. 
LGDP, LPROD, LEXPA, LGERD, LEXP, LINV, LTRD, LLGERD, LLGDPCP are 
the above variables in logarithmic and in loglogarithm form. 
 
  The correlation between productivity and patenting is much closer than between 
productivity and research expenditure. When conducting an econometric analysis of the 
technological gap models, it is important to include the most relevant variables. For the 
level of productivity, as a proxy we can use real GDP per capita (GDPPC). For the 
national technological level we can use some approximate measures, for instance we can 
again use the traditional variables of technological input and technological output 
(GERD and EXPA). 
  Following the model of Fagerberg (1987, 1988, 1994) we can test the basic 
technological gap model (with and without these variables), reflecting structural change, 
in order to determine the degree to which these variables have added something to the 



























































































































































(EXPA) and gross expenditure on research and development (GERD) as proxies for the 
growth of national technological activities, and GDP per capita (GDPPC) (in absolute 
values at constant prices) as a proxy for the total level of knowledge appropriated in the 
country (or productivity). 
  Investment share (INV) has been chosen as an indicator of an improvement in 
the capacity for economic exploitation of innovation and diffusion; the share of 
investment may also be seen as the outcome of a process in which institutional factors 
take part (since differences in the size of investment share may reflect differences in the 
institutional system). Figure 1 shows the multifactor productivity growth for the 
Business Sector, for the period 1990-1999. 
 
  In addition, Table 10 shows the model for EU member states, including as 
additional variables exports (as a share of GDP) and the terms of trade; this indicates that 
growth has been influenced by changes in the terms of trade (terms of trade shock). The 
export variable also has the expected sign and the results support the hypothesis of 
structural change as a source of economic growth.  The second model takes account of 
structural changes using as a proxy the share of exports in GDP. The third model uses an 
additional variable that reflects changes in the macroeconomic conditions and suggests 
that growth rates are seriously affected by changes in the terms of trade. The models are 
tested for EU member states. The basic model is tested for the variables of GDP, GDP 
per capita, external patent applications and investment as a share of GDP. The 
explanatory power (or the overall goodness of fit of the estimated regression models) is 
not very high, but this is not surprising for cross-sectional data. However there is a 
problem with interdependence between the variables. For this reason we shall focus on   15 
the relationship between productivity and innovation. Most of the variables have the 
expected signs.   
Table 10: The basic model tested for the EU member states, 1973~1997 
The basic model including patents: 
 GDP = 2.824 - 0.002GDPPC + 0.10EXPA + 0.027INV 
t =  (1.53)           (-3.30)            (2.30)                (0.32)        R
2 = 0.52 (adj. df 0.39). DW = 1.52  
Rho (autocorrelation coefficient) = 0.385, t = 1.475. SEs and variance shown are 
heteroskedastic consistent estimates. 
The logarithm model: 
LGDP = 1.499 - 0.384LGDPPC + 0.155LEXPA + 0.806LINV 
t  =  (0.593)       (-2.569)                 (0.930)         (1.340)     R
2 = 0.56 (adj. df 0.42). DW = 1.36  
Rho (autocorrelation coefficient) = 0.297, t = 0.985. SEs and variance shown are 
heteroskedastic consistent estimates.  
The basic model including patents: 
PROD = 0.453 - 0.00015GDPPC - 0.0198EXPA + 0.174INV 
t =   (-0.386)             (-3.979)            (-0.245)    (3.012)    R
2 = 0.64 (adj. df 0.54). DW = 1.49  
Rho (autocorrelation coefficient) = 0.301. SEs and variance shown are heteroskedastic 
consistent estimates.  
The logarithmic model: 
LPROD = -0.566 - 0.384LGDPPC - 0.131LEXPA + 1.558LINV 
t =   (-0.220)          (-2.519)           (-0.770)          (2.541)    R
2 = 0.75 (adj. df 0.66). DW = 1.38  
Rho (autocorrelation coefficient) = 0.241, t = 0.786. SEs and variance shown are 
heteroskedastic consistent estimates.  
The basic model including the gross expenditures on research and development: 
GDP = 1.775 - 0.00129GDPPC + 0.0142GERD + 0.0646INV 
t  =    (0.92)             (-1.86)           (0.21)                (0.75) R
2 = 0.40 (adj. df 0.24). DW = 2.30  
Rho (autocorrelation coefficient) = -0.153, t=-0.539. SEs and variance shown are 
heteroskedastic consistent estimates. 
The logarithm model: 
LGDP = 0.619 - 0.275LGDPPC + 0.00625LGERD + 0.837LINV 
  t  =  (0.246)         (-2.098)        (0.0396)               (1.408) R
2 = 0.47 (adj. df 0.33). DW = 2.38  
Rho (autocor.coefficient) =  -0.228, t = -0.815. SEs and variance shown are 
heteroskedastic consistent estimates.  
The basic model including the gross expenditures on research and development: 
PROD = 0.349 - 0.00018GDPPC - 0.0716GERD + 0.168INV 
t = (0.231)         (-3.413)                  (0.933)        (2.677) R
2 = 0.66 (adj. df 0.57). DW= 1.43  
Rho (autocorrelation coefficient)=0.301. SEs and variance shown are heteroskedastic 
consistent estimates.  
The logarithmic model: 
LPROD = -0.404 - 0.421LGDPPC - 0.0345LGERD + 1.568LINV 
t =   (-0.130)           (-2.585)           (-0.176)             (2.126)   R
2 = 0.61 (adj. df 0.50) DW=1.79  
Rho (autocorrelation coefficient) = -0.0131, t = -0.0402. SEs and variance shown are 
heteroskedastic consistent estimates.  
Notes: GDP = annual average growth rates for real gross domestic product. PROD = 
annual average growth rates for product (defined as labour product GDP per person 
employed). GDPPC = average absolute values in constant (1985) prices (US$ 000) for 
GDP per capita. EXPA = annual average growth rates for external patent applications. 
GERD = annual average growth rates for gross expenditures on research and 
development. EXP = annual average growth rates for exports as a share of GDP. INV = 
annual average growth rates for investment as a share of GDP. TRD = annual average   16 
growth rates for the terms of trade. LGDP, LPROD, LEXPA, LGERD, LEXP, LINV 
and LTRD are the above variables in a logarithmic form.  
  The introduction of the terms of trade variable into the basic model led to a 
negative sign for the innovation variables (GERD and EXPA); this indicates that the 
economic slowdown after 1973 can be better explained by a terms of trade shock. 
However, some of the results are not statistically significant and the explanatory power 
is not very high.   
  In both cases we used the same approach, first testing the basic model and then 
introducing the terms of trade and export variables. It is worth noting that for the 
technologically advanced member states the estimated coefficients display the expected 
signs except for exports (EXPA) and gross expenditure on R&D (GERD). The results do 
not support the hypothesis of structural changes as independent causal factors of 
economic growth. These results can be seen as supporting the view that the influence of 
a change in outward orientation on growth depends on the international macroeconomic 
conditions (since random shocks and crises and slow growth in world demand in the 
1970s restrained the growth of outward-oriented countries).  
 
Table 11: Trends in multi-factor productivity growth,
1,2 1990-95 and 1995-99 
  1990-95  1995-99 
Ireland 4,4  4,6 
Finland 3,0  3,6 
Belgium 1,3  1,6 
Australia 1,4  1,5 
Denmark 1,5  1,5 
Netherlands 1,9  1,5 
Iceland 1,2  1,4 
Canada 1,1  1,3 
Sweden 1,3  1,3 
United States  1,0  1,2 
Norway 2,1  1,2 
France 0,9  1,1 
Germany 1,1  1,1 
United Kingdom  0,8  1,0 
Japan 1,3  0,9 
Italy 1,2  0,8 
New Zealand  1,0  0,7 
Spain 0,9  0,5 
1.  Adjusted for hours worked, based on trend series and time-varying factor shares. 
2.  2. Series end in 1997 for Austria, Belgium, Italy and New Zealand; 1998 for 
Australia, Denmark, France, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands and United Kingdom. Data 
for Germany start in 1991. 
3.  Source: OECD calculations, based on data from the OECD Economic Outlook No. 
68. See S. Scarpetta et al., Economics Department Working Paper No. 248, 2000 for 
details; May 2001. 
 
Productivity ratios relate a measure of output to one or several inputs to 
production. The most common productivity measure is labour productivity, which 
links output to labour input. It is a key economic indicator as it is closely associated   17 
with standards of living. Ideally, estimates of labour productivity growth should 
incorporate changes in hours worked.  
Estimates of the increase in GDP per hour worked for OECD countries–adjusted for 
the business cycle – show that Korea, Ireland and Luxembourg  had the highest rates 
of productivity growth in the 1990s. Switzerland, New Zealand, Spain and Mexico 
had the lowest. In countries such as Ireland, Australia, the United States, Greece and 
Germany, labour productivity growth in the second half of the 1990s was 
substantially higher than in the first half.  Table 11 indicates the trends in multi-factor 
productivity growth, for the period 1990-1995 and also for 1995-1999. 
Labour productivity is a partial measure of productivity; it relates output to 
only one input in the production process, albeit an important one. More complete 
measures of productivity at the economy-wide level relate output growth to the 
combined use of labour and capital inputs.  
This measure is called multi-factor productivity (MFP). Growth in MFP is key 
to long-term economic growth, as it indicates rising efficiency in the use of all 
available resources. It is also a better reflection of technological progress than the 
increase in labour productivity, since the latter can also be achieved through greater 
use of capital in the production process and the dismissal of low-productivity workers.  
Estimates of MFP growth are available for fewer countries than estimates of 
labour productivity growth, primarily because of the limited availability of data on 
capital stock. The estimates show that Ireland and Finland experienced the most rapid 
MFP growth over the 1990s. In countries such as Ireland, Finland, Belgium, 
Australia, Canada, the United States, France and the United Kingdom, MFP growth 
accelerated during the 1990s. In other countries, such as the Netherlands, Norway, 
Spain and Japan, MFP growth declined.  
 
3. Conclusions  
  Technological progress has become virtually synonymous with long-term 
economic growth. This raises a basic question about the capacity of both industrial and 
newly industrialised countries to translate their seemingly greater technological capacity 
into productivity and economic growth. Usually, there are difficulties in estimating the 
relation between technology change and productivity. Technological change may have 
accelerated, but in some cases there is a failure to capture the effects of recent 
technological advances in productivity growth or a failure to account for quality changes 
in previously introduced technologies.  
  The countries of Europe have a long cultural and scientific tradition and the 
major scientific discoveries and developments in technology are products of European 
civilisation. There is a close relationship between innovation and productivity levels. 
However there are large technological disparities between the member states, which 
affects productivity performance, increases economic disparities and hinders economic 
integration.  
  There are various explanations in the literature for the slow-down in productivity 
growth in the OECD countries. One source of the slow-down may be substantial 
changes in the industrial composition of output, employment, capital accumulation and 
resource utilisation. Another may be that technological opportunities have declined; or 
else new technologies have been developed but their application to production has been 
less successful. Technological factors act in a long-term way and should not be expected 
to explain medium-term variations in the growth of GDP and productivity. 
  The technological gap models represent two conflicting forces: innovation, 
which tends to increase productivity differences between countries; and diffusion, which   18 
tends to reduce them. In Schumpeterian theory, growth differences are seen as the 
combined result of these forces. We have applied an economic growth model based on 
Schumpeterian logic. This technological gap model provides a good explanation of the 
differences among various countries. The empirical estimates suggest that the 
convergence hypothesis applies for industrialised countries. Research on why growth 
rates differ has a long history that goes well beyond growth accounting exercises. The 
idea that poorer countries eventually catch up with richer ones was advanced as early as 
in the nineteenth century, to explain continental Europe's convergence with Britain. In 
the 1960s one of the most basic model was the Marx~Lewis model of abundant labour 
supplies, which explained the divergent growth experience of the Western European 
countries.  
  To achieve safe results it is necessary to conduct a cross-country, multi sectoral 
analysis of how technological activities affect the different sectors. According to our 
estimates there is a relationship between the level of economic growth and the growth of 
technological activities. Technological activities (best measured by patents) appear to 
contribute considerably to economic growth, unless this is a negative demand effect. 
Specifically, our results confirm that there is a close relationship between the level of 
economic growth (as measured by per capita GDP) and the level of technological 
development (as measured by the number of external patents). Our results indicate that 
both imitation and innovation activities have a significant effect on the growth of GDP 
and productivity. Countries that are technologically backward might be able to generate 
more rapid growth than even the advanced countries if they were given the opportunity 
to exploit the new technologies employed by the technological leaders.  
  The pace of the catching up depends on the diffusion of knowledge, the rate of 
structural change, the accumulation of capital and the expansion of demand. Those 
member states whose growth rates are lagging behind could catch up if they reduced the 
technological gap. An important aspect of this is that they should not rely only on 
technology imports and investment, but should also increase their innovation activities 
and improve their locally produced technologies (as happened in Korea and Singapore).  
  However our results confirm that some of the small and medium-sized EU 
member states have attained high levels of per capita GDP without a large innovation 
capacity. To explain the differences in growth between these countries in the postwar 
period a much more detailed analysis of economic, social and institutional structures 
should be conducted. When we compare the technologically advanced and less advanced 
member states, it is not difficult to see that the less advanced countries lacked experience 
of large-scale production, technical education and resources.  
  The catching-up hypothesis is related to economic and technological relations 
among countries. There are different opportunities for countries to pursue a development 
strategy that depends on resource and scale factors. In summary, we can say that the 
introduction of new technologies has influenced industrialisation and economic growth. 
Of course, for countries with poor technological apparatus the impact of new 
technologies is much smaller. Finally, it seems that the technological gap between the 
less and more advanced countries is still widening.  
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